Decentralization, mesogovernments, and the new logic of welfare provision in Spain by Moreno, Luis & Arriba, Ana
Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados (CSIC) 
Working Paper 99-01 
Decentralization, mesogovernments, and the new logic of welfare provision 
in Spain 
Luis Moreno and Ana Arriba  
 
Instituto de Estudios Sociales Avanzados 
(CSIC, Madrid)  
Abstract 
The Spanish welfare state incorporates elements of both Bismarckian and Beveridgean 
traditions, and can be labelled as a via media with respect to other existing regimes of 
social protection. It also represents a middle way of de-commodification and gendering, and 
of universal and means-tested access to services and benefits. Spain, thus, has 
reconstructed a medium-size system of social protection as compared to the countries of 
the European Union.  
The most relevant factor conditioning welfare development in Spain is the deep process of 
decentralisation both at the level of planning and policy implementation. Decentralisation of 
social services has had a much larger impact than privatisation. Social assistance is a 
power of the 'exclusive competence' of Spanish mesogovernments (Comunidades 
Autónomas). These institutional actors have made use of these powers for purposes mainly 
of institutional legitimisation. Of great relevance for the completion of the ‘safety net’ has 
been the implementation of the new regional programmes of rentas mínimas de inserción 
(minimum income benefits).  
The principle of territorial subsidiarity was enshrined in the Treaty of European Union of 
1992, and provides for decisions to be taken transnationally only if local, regional or 
national levels cannot perform better. In other words, the preferred locus for decision-
making is that closer to the citizen, and as local as possible. The paper concludes that the 
rationale implicit in the principle of decentralisation in Spain, and that of territorial 
subsidiarity in the European Union, favours the participation of sub-state layers of 
government in the running of social programmes. Policy innovation concerning social 
policies developed by sub-state communities with a ‘cosmopolitan localism’ perspective can 
be more effective and efficient, as the Spanish case seems to validate. 
Introduction: European southern welfare 
In recent times, a distinct model of South European welfare (Greece, Italy, Portugal and 
Spain) has been contended (Ferrera, 1995, 1996, 1997; Moreno, 1997b; Rhodes, 1996; 
MIRE, 1997). The discussion revolves around on whether the Mediterranean type of 
welfare constitutes a regime of its own or is simply made up of a ‘family of nations’ (Castles, 
1993) lagging behind those of the ‘continental’ model of social insurance to which they 
belong (Katrougalos, 1996). Other views regard it as a mere ‘Latin rim’ characterised by a 
rudimentary level of social provision and institutional development (Leibfried, 1992; Gough, 
1996).  
Unlike the Continental, Scandinavian or Anglo-Saxon typologies (Esping-Andersen, 1990), 
cross-national studies including Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain are lacking[1]. A good 
few issues deserve a closer examination, which could help us to define the overall picture 
of a Mediterranean type of welfare. However, there is an analytical common ground to be 
explored. 
The four South European countries share analogies regarding historical backgrounds, 
value-systems, and institutional peculiarities. They all had past experiences of authoritarian 
and dictatorial rule (for longer periods in the case of Portugal and Spain), and have suffered 
from economic and industrial ‘delays’ in the processes of modernisation (except for early-
industrialised areas in Italy and Spain) (Giner, 1986). The religious factor has had a 
structuring role in all four countries, but the role of the Church as main organiser of social 
protection has diminished[2]. This feature seems to correspond with a higher degree of 
secularisation in the social practices of Southern Europe. The impact of Europeanisation 
and globalisation have brought about, respectively, increasing incentives to economic 
convergence with Northern and Central Europe (Economic and Monetary Union), and 
world-trade pressures to restrict social programmes. In broad terms, similar social-
demographic trends and macro-economic constraints can be observed in all four South 
European countries. 
As concerns the cultural-axiological dimension of welfare development there is a self-
perception of differentiated needs and lifestyles (intra-familial pooling of resources, home 
ownership, and heterogeneity of social reproduction). Also noticeable is a compelling 
household solidarity and a pre-eminence of values of family inclusion and life cycle 
redistribution (gift mechanisms, processes of age emancipation, proliferation of family 
companies and jobs). Moreover, cultural choices and practices have structured their civil 
societies in a characteristic mode resulting in heterogeneity of social reproduction, and 
particularistic practices in various kinds and degrees (social networking, patronage, 
clientelism, and group predation). 
In institutional terms, labour markets in Southern Europe show an apparent cleavage 
between ‘insiders’ (hyper-protected core workforce), ‘peripheral’ (in- between gainfully 
employed) and ‘outsiders’ (precarious, ‘left-outs’, and ‘junk’ labourers). There are 
fragmented systems of income guarantees and wide inter-generation disparities in cash 
benefits (e.g. overprotection of the elderly in Greece and Italy[3]). The status maintenance 
principle characteristic of the contributory systems in Continental Europe links cash benefits 
to work position and, thus, are to be financed by both employers and employees. There is a 
preference for subsidiarity and an emphasis in the role of intermediary structures. However, 
publicly subsidised organisations, rather than subsidiary private and/or voluntary 
associations, carry out a significant number in the production/provision of social services.  
Both Mediterranean welfare mix and the gender/family/work nexus are adaptable and 
complementary. On analysing politico-institutional development the pivotal role of the family 
in social protection cannot be over-emphasised. In Southern Europe the welfare state is to 
a large extent the Mediterranean welfare family. Intra-familial transfers are both material 
and immaterial. Concerning the latter, the involvement of women in both care of the elderly 
and children is crucial. However, the increasing participation of female workers in the labour 
force, coupled with new burdens for family formation and expansion, raise big questions, as 
to whether Mediterranean welfare can survive, as we know it at present (Saraceno, 1995; 
Guillén, 1997). 
The Spanish welfare state can be labelled as a via media of universalistic (health care, 
education, social assistance) and occupational (income maintenance) regimes, and 
between breadwinner ‘continental’ and citizenship-centred ‘liberal’ models. It also 
represents a middle way of de-commodification and gendering, and of universal and 
means-tested access to services and benefits.  
The welfare state in Spain represents a fundamental structure for both social reproduction 
and political legitimisation[4]. Since its integration in the European Community (1986), 
Spain has followed a pattern of welfare convergence with their European counterparts of a 
three-fold nature. Firstly, an universalisation of social entitlements (education, health, 
pensions). Secondly, a confluence in the pattern of welfare expenditure to the median of its 
European partners. Thirdly, a diversification in the provision of social services by private 
and ‘third sector’ organisations[5].  
Regional home rule can be regarded as the most relevant factor conditioning welfare 
development in Spain. The decentralization process embodied in the 1978 Spanish 
Constitution has undergone a long period of consolidation. The degree of autonomy for the 
Spanish nationalities and regions is considerable. This is illustrated by the evolution of the 
distribution of public expenditure in the three-tier system of government reproduced as 
follows: 
Table 1. TERRITORIAL DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC EXPENDITURE IN SPAIN (%) 
In Spain, liberalisation in the provision of welfare services is observable in a certain 
extension of free-market morals and, thus, in the proliferation of 'non-profit' –but 
characteristically subsidised—NGOs (Sarasa, 1997). At the same time, a trend away from 
‘residualism’ can be detected. In fact some reforms of universalisation have been put into 
effect in recent years encompassing some basic entitlements with traditional income related 
programmes. Both a level of medium to low intensity in pension payments and a degree of 
fragmentation in policy provision is, however, to be noted. 
Social expenditure has grown significantly since the demise of Franco’s dictatorship, in 
1975. It has done so at a higher level than the whole of the EU. Note that during 1980-94, 
all Southern European countries increased their social expenditure at a higher rate than the 
mean figure of 4.3 per cent for EU-12: 6.3 per cent, Greece; 5.9 per cent, Italy; 6.7; 
Portugal; and 5.5 per cent, Spain (see Table 2). In the period 1980-94, the EU states with 
the highest real growth rates of protection benefits per person were the four Southern 
European countries. Their average percentages of increase were 75 per cent and over. In 
the case of Portugal the growth rate reached around 140 per cent (Eurostat, 1997: 245). 
(Needles to say, countries like Germany, Denmark or the Netherlands had a level of social 
protection much higher than the Mediterranean countries. For instance, despite that the 
German growth rate for 1980-94 was little more than 20 per cent, their level of welfare 
benefits was approximately four times higher than that of Spain. This country increased 
their real growth rates of social protection around 80 per cent for the same period of time.) 
Table 2. SOCIAL PROTECTION CURRENT EXPENDITURE IN THE EU-12 COUNTRIES 
(as percentages of GDP in market prices)
  19811 1984 1987 1990 1992 1997 19992 
CENTRAL 87.3 75.6 72.6 66.2 63.0 59.5 54 
REGIONAL 3.0 12.2 14.6 20.5 23.2 26.9 33 
LOCAL 9.7 12.1 12.8 13.3 13.8 13.6 13 
1 Beginning of the process of decentralization. 2 Government’s estimates.   
Source: Spanish Ministry of Public Administrations (MAP, 1997) 
Recent reforms carried out in Spain are to have a far-reaching and enduring effect in future 
welfare developments. First, the universalisation of the educational system has meant that 
100 per cent of the population in the 4-15-year age group has access to nursery, primary, 
and secondary schooling[6]. In 1986 the implementation of the General Health Act provided 
for health care for all Spaniards and foreign citizens resident in Spain. In 1990, the Non-
Contributory Pensions Act established a universal coverage for both (over 65 years) and 
disability pensions (citizens between 18 and 65 years and with a degree of disability of 65 
percent or higher). In 1996, the ‘Pact of Toledo’ was agreed by the main political parties, 
and subsequently received the support of the main social partners. It establishes that, by 
the year 2000, expenses by the contributory social security system should be met by both 
employers’ and employees’ contributions. General taxation should be responsible for the 
cost of the universal non-contributory benefits and services.  
Thus, in Spain there has been a growth of institutional ‘stateness’, or state penetration of 
the welfare sphere (Flora, 1986/87; Kuhnle, 1997). However, this should not be interpreted 
in Jacobin terms, by which central administration and government are concepts 
synonymous to that of the state. In referring to ‘stateness’ we take into account the whole of 
state institutions, i.e. central, regional and local. In fact, the Comunidades Autónomas 
(Autonomous Communities) have taken of leading role in the development of programmes 
of social assistance and social services. Due to the growing importance of the regional and 
local levels in the provision of welfare programmes, this is an area of study of increasing 
relevance for social policy researchers (Alber, 1995). 
The process of decentralization in Spain 
After Franco's death in 1975, the democratic parties advocated home-rule for all the 
Spanish nationalities and regions. The broad political consensus among parties, which 
made the drawing up of the 1978 Constitution possible, also brought with it an element of 
ambiguity in the formulation of the territorial organisation of the Spanish state. An implicit 
open model of asymmetrical federalisation was adopted, by which the three ‘historical 
  1980 1985 1993 % (1980-1993) 
Belgium 28,0 29,3 27,6 -0,4 
Denmark 28,7 27,8 33,2 +4,5 
Germany 28,8 28,4 31,0 +2,2 
France 25,4 28,8 30,9 +5,5 
Ireland 20,6 23,6 21,4 +0,8 
Luxembourg 26,5 23,1 24,9 -1,6 
Netherlands 30,1 31,7 33,6 +3,5 
United Kingdom 21,5 24,3 27,8 +6,3 
EU-12 24,3 26,0 27,8 +3,5 
Greece 9,7 15,4 16,3 +6,6 
Italy 19,4 22,4 25,8 +6,4 
Portugal 12,8 14,1 19,5 +6,7 
Spain 18,1 19,9 24,0 +5,8 
Source: Eurostat, 1995: 16. 
nationalities’ (Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia) would have a special constitutional 
recognition for their claims to self-government. However, the formulation of a clear division 
of powers based upon ‘conventional’ federal techniques was avoided, and no discrimination 
in the degree of home rule was established between ‘historical nationalities’ and the rest of 
the regions of the 17 Comunidades Autónomas.  
The construction of the Estado de las Autonomías had to follow a ‘top-down’ process of 
decentralization, and has undergone a long period of consolidation. Support for autonomy, 
apart from the Basque, Catalan and Galician communities, has been particularly strong in 
Andalusia and other regions (Aragon, the Canary Islands, Navarre and Valencia). In Spain 
as a whole, the process of decentralization has been assessed favourably as ‘totally 
positive’ (11 per cent) or ‘more positive that negative’ (49 per cent) by a majority the 
population[7]. 
In parallel with the home-rule-all-round process, there has been a likewise extension of a 
new type of cosmopolitan localism in Spain. This is reflected in both societal interests 
aimed at developing a sense of local community, and at participating actively in regional, 
national and international spheres. A growing congruence between the particular and the 
general is noticeable. All Spanish mesogovernments have made explicit their European 
vocation and have embraced the desire of a majority of Spaniards for deepening 
Europeanisation in the economic, political and social realms (Moreno, 1998).  
With the gradual establishment of the Estado de las Autonomías a complex of relations has 
developed which can be explained by a model of ‘multiple ethnoterritorial 
concurrence’ (Moreno, 1995)[8]. Its defining traits incorporate social, economic and political 
elements[9] in a dynamic manner and are, thus, responsible for the Spanish process of 
federalisation.  
Since the transition to democracy in Spain, agreements and conflicts have taken place in a 
multiplicity of cases and circumstances. Eventual cooperation and mutual recognition of 
differences have often been reached between centre and periphery, or national and 
regional groups. But such agreements should not be regarded as mechanical outcomes in 
a linear political process. Asymmetry, heterogeneity[10] and plurality remain as chiefly 
elements conditioning the process of federalisation in Spain.  
As regards our subsequent discussion, we will refer to some of the elements of this model 
of ‘multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence’. They are at the basis of the new welfare rationale 
developed by the Spanish sub-state nationalities and regions.  
Mesogovernments as main actors of social assistance and social services 
In Spain, political decentralization and administrative de-concentration of social services 
have had a much larger impact than privatisation (Almeda & Sarasa, 1996)[11]. The 
institutional outcome of the interplay between central, regional, and local governments 
responds to the very nature of a contractually open process of power accommodation. The 
present section concentrates on the analysis of the central role played by the Spanish 
mesogovernments in the development of social services and social assistance. The lack of 
a clear division between these two realms characterises welfare arrangements in 
contemporary Spain (Casado, 1987).  
For purposes of policy analysis, social assistance can be distinguished as a technique for 
providing guaranteed income based on means testing (Gough, 1997). Its main features 
concern the targeting of beneficiaries lacking resources, its residual and complementary 
character with the social insurance system, the transfer of monetary subsidies subject to 
possible obligations to be met by the users, its universal access to all eligible beneficiaries, 
and its financing by general taxation. Social assistance differs from traditional public 
beneficence, as it is a public service providing guaranteed minimum resources and not just 
material survival to its beneficiaries.  
A sixth level of welfare provision has also been referred to as a system of personal or 
general social services (Kahn & Kamerman, 1987; Anttonen & Sipilä, 1997). Social services 
aim at providing the means for citizens’ well being and social integration. Their scope of 
action has evolved from the provision of material help to precarious citizens to the 
development of programmes for ‘ordinary’ individuals and families. 
The fragmented and inductive[12] nature of the reforms implemented in the last decades is 
a characteristic not only of the Spain as a single case, but of South European welfare as a 
whole. An historical review of the reforms implemented in Spain since the inception of the 
democratic Constitution of 1978 is needed to gain analytical perspective. 
1978-1987: The establishment of the regional systems of social services 
At the end of the Francoist period in Spain, social assistance was characterised by a scarce 
public financing, a limited degree of social protection, and the important role played by 
some private institutions (The Roman Catholic Church, some quasi-public Saving Banks, 
and the Red Cross, primarily). The small supply of social services was provided by a variety 
of both public bodies and private institutions.  
In 1977, the General Directorate for Social Action and Social Services was established 
within the Ministry of Health and Social Security. This governmental body took over those 
responsibilities of social assistance which had been previously attached to various 
departments of the central government (Home Ministry, principally). It run programmes 
such as those related to the Social Assistance Fund (Fondo de Asistencia Social), whose 
non-contributory benefits covered old-age and disability pensions. This was considered to 
be the principal instrument of social assistance at that time.  
Within the contributory system of the social security, there were services for gainfully 
employees and their dependent family members. In 1978, the social security system was 
re-structured with the grouping of old-age and disabled services into the Institute for Social 
Services (INSERSO-Instituto de Servicios Sociales), a quasi-autonomous public agency of 
the social security within the framework of the Ministry of Labour. 
In parallel, local authorities (municipalities and provincial authorities) continued to run 
various programmes of social assistance, which were in many cases the inheritors of 
traditional public charities and beneficence. Private institutions also continued to provide 
charitable donations and some services, particularly those offered by RC Church 
organisations. 
In the period of transition to democracy, renewed citizens’ demands for the implementation 
of new social services were coupled with an active mobilisation of the social workers in 
order to develop a new framework of service provision (Sarasa, 1993; Casado et al, 1994). 
The 1978 Constitution inaugurated the period of institutionalisation of the social services in 
Spain. According to the Spanish Carta Magna, social assistance is a regional power of the 
‘exclusive competence’ of the 17 Autonomous Communities (art. 148; 1.20). Powers 
concerning the basic legislation and the economic regime of the social security system 
remain within the domain of the central government. However, the Comunidades 
Autónomas (Autonomous Communities) can exercise executive powers in the running of 
contributory programmes which can be decentralized to them (art. 149; 1.17). 
The constitutional provisions neither define nor regulate both realms of social assistance 
and social services. Furthermore, all those powers and responsibilities which are not listed 
as ‘exclusive competence’ of the central government can be claimed and exercised by the 
Autonomous Communities (art 149.3). 
As a consequence of the flexibility of the constitutional provisions, all Autonomous 
Communities claimed in their Statutes of Autonomy (regional constitutional laws) a large 
number of services and functions concerning social assistance, social services, community 
development, social promotion and welfare policies in general. The only services, which 
remained outside the request of the mesogovernments, were those of the INSERSO. 
However, and as we will analysed below, during the 1990s the executive powers for the 
running of practically all INSERSO services have also been transferred to the 
Comunidades Autónomas. 
During the period 1982-1993, the Autonomous Communities took the legislative initiative in 
their regional parliaments, and passed acts which established regional systems of social 
services. In these pieces of legislation there were no references to social assistance as 
such. The implicit assumption was that, according to a comprehensive interpretation, social 
assistance was an ‘exclusive’ power of the Autonomous Communities, alongside with the 
social services. In this period the main concern for the Spanish mesogovernments was to 
request and receive as many powers from the central administration as a flexible 
interpretation of the 1978 Constitution could allow. The Comunidades Autónomas have 
made extensive use of their constitutional prerogative for purposes of institutional 
legitimisation. 
A common claim in the legislation adopted by the regional parliaments to develop an 
integrated network of social services was the principle of decentralization. According to this, 
local governments would carry out the bulk of service provision[13], but the powers of 
legislation, planning, and co-ordination with the private and altruistic sectors would rest 
upon regional executives and legislatures. 
All regional laws envisaged the social services as an integrated public system, open to all 
citizens without discrimination. Universality and equality were, thus, the two ideological 
foundations of the regional legislation on welfare provision. Traditional public beneficence 
was to be ‘updated’ avoiding stigmatisation of the beneficiaries. All things considered, the 
aim was one of modernisation of the social services in line with other experiences of 
welfare provision in Western Europe. Such aspirations were to be in tune with the aim of 
rationalising the provision of new social services.  
On establishing the public systems of social services, the idea of the welfare ‘mix’ was also 
embraced enthusiastically by most Spanish mesogovernments. Non-profit organisations, in 
particular, were incorporated in the general provision of social services, and many of them 
were subsidised by the regional public bodies.  
The processes for the implementation of regional systems of social services in Spain were 
not developed without a degree of friction with the central government. In 1986, a decision 
of the Constitutional Court (146/1986) established that, despite the ‘exclusive’ powers of the 
Autonomous Communities in this field, the central government could also develop 
programmes of social assistance guaranteeing an equal treatment to all Comunidades 
Autónomas. 
Among the initiatives taken by the central government during this period, the passing of the 
LISMI Law (1982) is to be underlined. This piece of legislation provided guaranteed benefits 
to citizens with disability (65 per cent or higher). In the years 1983-84, the Socialist 
Government also attempted unsuccessfully to enact a National Act of Social Services. This 
Law would aim at integrating all ‘scattered’ social services within the contributory system of 
the social security into one institutional framework, centrally managed. But the Spanish 
mesogovernments remained as the main protagonists in the area of welfare development, 
a logical consequence of the home-rule-all-round process of decentralization (Casado et al, 
1994).  
1988-1995: The development of welfare programmes 
The year 1988 can be identified as the beginning of a cycle of major developments 
concerning social services in Spain, and of a big expansion of social spending. The 
establishment in 1988 of the Ministry of Social Affairs[14] aimed at the development of a 
social policy, and area of public intervention which had been ‘hidden’ within the 
organisational structure of the Ministry of Labour. However, central intervention was 
somewhat conditioned by the consolidation of the regional systems promoted by the 
Spanish Comunidades Autónomas. Some views were expressed against the establishment 
of a Ministry which would lack of many powers already decentralized to the 
mesogovernments (Beltrán, 1992). 
But the newly created Ministry of Social Affairs pursued a course of action of co-ordination 
with the mesogovernments in the development of General Plans such as those concerning 
Old-age, Drug Addiction, Equal Opportunities, or Youth. These Plans were not passed as 
pieces of legislation by the Spanish Parliament. They were agreements aiming at making 
functional the structures of welfare provision in the whole of Spain. In particular, they paved 
the way for the future transfer of the social services of the INSERSO to the regional 
systems of social services. 
The most important agreement between the three layers of governments took place in 1987 
with the approval of the ‘Concerted Plan for the Development of the Basic Provision of 
Social Services by the Local Authorities’ (Plan Concertado para el Desarrollo de 
Prestaciones Básicas de Servicios Sociales de las Corporaciones Locales). This 
intergovernmental agreement has resulted in an administrative co-operation between 
central, regional and local governments. The aim is that of providing services at the 
municipal level for the following purposes: (a) information and counselling; (b) social and 
day care services for the disabled and elderly; (c) refuge for abused women, single 
mothers, orphans or mistreated minors, and shelter housing for the homeless; and (d) 
prevention and social insertion.  
This network of centres constitutes the basic level for primary attention in Spain[15], and 
was supported by all Autonomous Communities except the Basque Country[16]. The 
annual financing of this Plan is met on equitable terms by the three layers of governments. 
This agreement was the first in a model of intergovernmental relations characteristic of the 
process of federalisation of politics in Spain. Its implications for other policy areas has been 
of no little significance (Agranoff, 1993). 
During this period the major reform carried out by the central government was the 
universalisation of old-age and disability pensions. In 1990, the Law of Non-Contributory 
Pensions of the Social Security (26/1990) put into effect the awarding of means-tested 
benefits for old-age and disabled citizens outside the social security system, as well as their 
dependent family members.  
Note that in the period 1980-92, the total number of pensioners rose by 2,5 million (2,1, 
contributory, and 0,4, non-contributory), from 4,7 to 7,2 million. The total expenditure 
increased from 5.9 per cent, contributory, and 0.1 per cent, non-contributory) as a 
percentage of the Spanish GDP. Average social security pension benefits increased from 
66.5 per cent of the minimum salary in 1980 to 93.3 per cent in 1992, and 100 per cent in 
1995. Non-contributory pensions amounted to 53.3 per cent of the legal minimum salary in 
1992 (Cruz Roche, 1994)[17]. 
Let us remind that the executive responsibilities for the running of the INSERSO services 
were handed over to the Autonomous Communities[18]. In parallel, the Autonomous 
Communities decided to implement their programmes of minimum income for insertion 
(rentas mínimas de inserción), which will be dealt with in the next section. 
The fragmented composition of the Spanish ‘safety net’ 
The implementation of the public systems of social services by the Spanish 
mesogovernments has been coupled with the regional development of new social 
assistance programmes, and the executive management of former social security services. 
To the assistance subsidies inherited from the traditional schemes of public beneficence, 
and the management of the non-contributory pensions, the implementation of the rentas 
mínimas de inserción (minimum income of insertion, IMIs) are to be added. Contingent and 
ad hoc benefits are also granted to needy citizens. Beyond the discussion on the 
distribution of powers in decentralized Spain, the ‘safety net’ providing the minimum means 
of sustenance and civic integration to those citizens and families who lack of them rest 
mainly upon the network of regional systems of social services. 
As a consequence of the process initiated in 1978, social assistance and social services 
are concepts and areas of policy provision which often are made equal or synonymous. 
Institutional fragmentation continues to be a defining trait of the Spanish welfare state, 
although the intergovernmental collaboration of the three layers of government can be 
regarded as a decisive factor in the rationalisation of welfare provision. The process of 
reform, however, is far from being over.  
The approval of regional acts and the development of the Plan Concertado have been 
carried out on universalistic grounds. Access is, therefore, available for all citizens. 
Nevertheless, some programmes and benefits, as those concerning minimum income 
guarantees of non-contributory and disability pensions, are targeted with a social 
assistance criterion on the least-favoured. As a consequence, both social service culture 
and approach by the social workers is somewhat balanced out between universalism and 
selectivity (Serrano & Arriba, 1998). 
The principle of decentralization put forward by the regional legislation has been limited. In 
fact, a certain re-centralisation of the policy-making process on the intermediate layer of 
government, i.e. the regional, is noticeable. Important political decisions regarding the IMIs, 
and the organisation and planning of the services developed according to the Plan 
Concertado, have reflected not only a higher degree of political dynamism by the 
Comunidades Autónomas, but also the subsidiary role played by local councils dependent 
to a great extent on regional financial sources and regional political concerns[19]. Only the 
big cities have been able to challenge the mesogoverments as main protagonists in the 
development of social services. 
The considerable expansion of both social services and social assistance programmes has 
resulted in a de iure segmentation between the contributory (social insurance system for 
‘insiders’ and gainfully employees) and social assistance realms of welfare provision (for 
those excluded from the formal labour market). However, both domains are intertwined in a 
manner which results in an aggregate of social provision. This has been inspired by the 
general principle of social citizenship and has, thus, expanded the ‘grey zones’ between 
both social insurance and welfare assistance realms (Moreno & Sarasa, 1992, 1993).  
Policy innovation and regional mimesis: The programmes of minimum income 
The Spanish mesogovernments have shown an active interest for policy innovation 
concerning welfare programmes. Among the various actions taken by them one is to be 
identified as having far-reaching repercussions for the system of social protection in Spain: 
the programmes of minimum income (renta mínimas de inserción)[20], which we analyse 
subsequently.  
First, we will discuss the strategies carried out by the Spanish mesogovernments in order to 
secure the implementation of the IMIs. The process started in September of 1988 with the 
announcement by the Basque Government of a regional Plan de Lucha contra la Pobreza 
(Programme against Poverty). This sparked off a regional mimesis, or ‘demonstration 
effect’, on the part of the other 16 Comunidades Autónomas. By the end of 1990, all 
Spanish mesogovernments were engaged in implementation of regional programmes of 
minimum income[21].  
Some of the programmes of minimum income were established mainly on the initiative of 
the regional governments, and as a result of the combined action by both types of policy-
makers (elected politicians and executive officials). In some other cases, the pressure 
exerted by the opposition parties in the regional parliaments was the main factor behind the 
elaboration of these programmes. Finally, a third path of policy-making was due to the 
mobilization of the regional branches of the main trade unions (CC.OO and UGT), as well 
as some significant NGOs, such as Caritas.  
Despite the different actors shaping the policy impetus and design of the programmes of 
rentas mínimas de inserción, the Spanish Comunidades Autónomas are to be regarded as 
the main protagonists in their implementation. Let us not forget that, prior to the approval by 
the regional parliaments, no explicit popular demand was expressed in any of the 
Comunidades Autónomas as to encourage their implementation. The institutional factor 
making relevant the issue of the minimum income guaranteed was precisely the 
constitutional entitlement for the Autonomous Communities to exercise their political 
autonomy. No ‘path dependency’ could be referred to in this case. This fact validates the 
assumption that policy innovation concerning social policies developed by sub-state 
communities with a ‘cosmopolitan localism’ perspective can be more effective and efficient 
(Moreno, 1998).  
The regional programmes of minimum income have distinct characteristics mainly with 
regard to the intensity of the benefits and the insertion obligations to be complied by the 
beneficiaries. However, they are quasi-universalistic entitlements, which combine cash 
benefits with activation policies and programmes of social integration (employment 
promotion and vocational training courses, primarily). Their main common features can be 
identified as follows:  
(a) Families are the units of reference even though individuals can 
be single beneficiaries.  
(b) Means-tested criteria is related to a threshold of household 
income under which cash benefits are awarded (around two thirds of 
the minimum wage). 
(c) Residence status of applicants is required (ranging from 1 to 10 
years). 
(d) Periods of extension are available provided that beneficiaries 
have complied with social insertion activities and social needs 
remain the same. 
The central Ministry for Social Affairs showed no little reticence with the implementation of 
the regional programmes of minimum income. Its main reluctance concerned arguments of 
poverty dependency and labour disincentives. Allegations that these new regional policies 
could affect territorial solidarity throughout Spain were among its criticisms (Ministerio de 
Asuntos Sociales, 1989). However, the then newly-created Ministry had already opted for 
making the universalisation of the non-contributory pensions its main priority, exhausting in 
this ambitious programme most of its political capital within the central government. The 
initiative taken by the Comunidades Autónomas left little room for the institutional 
manoeuvring of the central Ministry, and was grounded on those constitutional provisions 
safeguarding regional self-government. Within this context, no action to boycott the 
implementation of the regional programmes of minimum income was to be expected from 
the Socialist Government.  
Since the beginning of the process, different arguments in favour or against the 
implementation of the regional IMIs were neither clear nor sophisticated in their analyses 
(Aliena, 1991). In this respect, the ‘simplicity’ of the arguments used by the Basque policy-
makers are very illustrative: (i) The IMIs were to overcome social marginalisation; (ii) No 
labour passivity was to been encouraged; (iii) EU recommendations and other European 
experiences, such as the French Revenu Minimum d’Insertion, lent support to the 
programme; and (iv) There was a high degree of inter-party consensus and support from 
various Basque civil institutions.  
Probably, among the factors above mentioned, the reference to EU recommendations is of 
particular importance. There was constant reference to the proposals made by the 
European Commission encouraging the recasting of the European systems of social 
protection so that guaranteed income could facilitate social and labour insertion to poor and 
excluded citizens. This became the main line of argument for the formulation of the regional 
IMIs. The French RMI attracted great attention due to its declared interest for establishing a 
linkage between the receipt of the benefits and the objective of social insertion for its 
beneficiaries.  
Subsequently, the main trade unions supported these programmes. They pursued a course 
of action alternative to the traditional negotiation and eventual agreement at the national 
level. In fact, the climate of confrontation between the central government and the trade 
unions induced these negotiations at the regional level. Note that, between the autumn of 
1989 and the spring of 1989, all the pacts subscribed between the mesogovernments and 
the trade unions (CC.OO and UGT) included the establishment of programmes of minimum 
income.  
In parallel, a number of NGOs (RC Church institutions and Caritas, principally) committed 
themselves to support the IMIs, both at regional level (Caritas parish councils), but also 
nationwide (Spanish Caritas). They demanded the implementation of the programmes of 
minimum income but did not participate in the forums where policy design was discussed 
(with the exception of Catalonia).  
Information about the various modalities and characteristics of the regional programmes 
was circulated among the Comunidades Autónomas. Formal and ad hoc meetings took 
place in which policy-makers and experts exchanged views and opinions on different 
aspects of the programmes to be implemented. Their main models of reference were the 
RMI, in France, and the ‘Programme against Poverty’, in the Basque Country.  
Programme elaboration was carried out in various manners by the Comunidades 
Autónomas. In some cases, think-tanks of politicians, officials and experts within the 
organic structure of the regional departments of social policy prepared ‘behind closed 
doors’ the pieces of legislation. In others, the process was open to the inputs made by trade 
unions or NGOs. However, the ultimate decision on the elaboration of the programmes 
remained with the mesogovernments. 
In the phase of actual implementation of the programmes, the Comunidades Autónomas 
had to establish institutional agreements with the local authorities within their territories. 
The latter were to be the executive cornerstone of the programmes’ success. Such 
agreements, however, brought about some delays in the implementation of the programme 
due to discrepancies stemming from the often different political colouring of local and 
regional administrations involved. This was evident in the case of large cities such as 
Barcelona controlled by the Socialists, but with a centre-right nationalist coalition at the 
Generalitat government, or Madrid, with a Conservative city hall and a Socialist regional 
administration. ‘Pretexts’ for conflict and institutional warfare referred in most cases to 
problems of financing, as well as to the lack of infrastructure for social centres for primary 
assistance.  
In the process of policy implementation others criticisms were put forward by the social 
workers and programme managers. Their initial attitude was one of general consent. 
Complaints on the excessive paperwork and bureaucratic burden were soon expressed. 
Likewise, the insufficient material infrastructure for the managing of the IMIs was also 
made. As already pointed out, the universalistic approach of the social services during the 
1980s was confronted with the targeting criteria towards the needy put forward by the 
programmes of minimum income.  
The process of policy implementation also confirmed the institutional leadership of the 
mesogoverments as main actors in the development of the IMIs. This factor was 
independent, in many cases, of partisan alignments. Let us remember, for instance, that the 
Socialists were in a government coalition with the Nationalists of the PNV in the Basque 
Country. They supported the first implemented IMI despite the reluctance of the Socialist 
Minister for Social Affairs. A similar situation took place in the region of Madrid. Thus, no 
consistent patterns of ideological standings are to be deduced from the political behaviour 
of the party organisations in the various institutional arenas of their participation. 
The Spanish mesogovernments have benefited in terms of political legitimisation as a 
consequence of the implementation of the IMIs. The visibility of the programmes was 
maximised by the fact that the financial implications of their implementation were not too 
dear for the regional treasuries. Besides, a clear message of policy innovation and political 
aggiornamento underlined their dynamic commitment to carry out the ‘closure’ of the 
system of social protection in Spain.  
As happened with the passing of the regional acts of social services, similar processes of 
mimesis took place with regard to the programmes of minimum income. Concerns about 
regional inequalities were not seriously considered. In fact, the mimesis effect produced by 
a multiple regional concurrence has arguably been one of levelling out ?at least in terms of 
social policy innovation? the institutional output of the Spanish mesogovernments. This has 
resulted in the establishment of a differentiated arena of policy provision vis-à-vis the 
central government. At the horizontal, level the Comunidades Autónomas have followed 
patterns of mobilisation rooted on a self-perceived ‘comparative grievance’: no region wants 
to be left behind. These perceptions have interacted in a conflictive manner with the 
‘differential fact’ claimed by the Spanish ‘historical nationalities: Basque Country, Catalonia 
and Galicia. These are more interested in maintaining a higher degree of home rule as 
compared with the rest of the Spanish Comunidades Autónomas. The combination of these 
processes has resulted in a de facto policy equalisation and in an incentive for policy 
innovation in those Spanish regions which have been traditionally lagging behind the 
‘modernised’ ones. 
Indeed, policy outcomes have resulted in some visible differences in the intensity of the 
benefits and, above all, the nature of the ‘insertion’ programmes to be accomplished by the 
beneficiaries. According to these differences three groups of IMIs can be identified: (a) 
Those establishing a link between the perception of the subsidy and the aim of insertion; (b) 
Those were insertion takes the from of a job contract, and the benefits are subject to 
workfare; and (c) Those discretionary and ad hoc social assistance benefits (Laparra & 
Aguilar, 1997).  
On explaining the differences in policy outcomes, the variable financial manoeuvrability has 
been adduced as the main explanatory factor. Certainly, the Basque Country and Navarre 
with a fiscal quasi-independence have been able to fund more generously their 
programmes of minimum income. Nevertheless, the setting of political priorities in policy 
funding appears to be the most compelling explanatory element. After all, the 
mesogovernments have also the final budgetary say in the running of a type of 
programmes which are the product of their own initiative. It remains to be seen whether 
these programmes will continue to be a priority for the regions. The limited coverage of the 
IMIs implied a degree of discretion in their daily functioning. The Comunidades Autónomas 
may face a situation of either requesting co-funding from the central government or 
containing the coverage scope of their benefits. 
The impact of these ab novo programmes of minimum income has had a dramatic effect in 
the debate about the completion of a ‘safety net’ in Spain. According to estimates provided 
by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs, in 1996 there were 211,221 beneficiaries in the 
whole of Spain including dependent family members (around 0,5 per cent of the Spanish 
population) (see Table 3 for basic data on minimum income programmes). In all future 
scenarios, the action by the regional and local government will be of decisive importance 
for the sustainability of the system of social protection in Spain. Indeed, the three-layer 
institutional interplay is a structuring variable, which pre-determines to a great extent the 
diverse nature of welfare outcomes in contemporary Spain.  
Table 3. REGIONAL EXPENDITURE AND COVERAGE OF THE PROGRAMMES OF 
MINIMUM INCOME 
  1996 1996 1996 1995 1995 













Andalusia 4,064,751,8544 10,6034 53,1674 0.21 0.37 
Aragon 480,376,492 1,112 64,898 0.06 0.26 
Asturias 1,342,902,709 1,511 41,510 1,18 0.48 
Balearics ––- –– –– –– –– 
Conclusion: subsidiarity and welfare provision 
The European principle of territorial subsidiarity, enshrined in the Treaty of Maastricht of 
1992, provides for decisions to be taken transnationally only if local, regional or national 
levels cannot perform better. In other words, the preferred locus for decision-making is that 
closer to the citizen, and as local as possible. Some central state political elites, reluctant to 
further the process of European institutionalisation, interpreted the subsidiarity principle as 
a safeguard for the preservation of traditional national sovereignty and, consequently, the 
powers to intervene centrally[22].  
The rationale implicit in the principle of subsidiarity favours the participation of sub-state 
layers of government in the running of public affairs, among which social provision appears 
to be an obvious priority. Territorial subsidiarity should furthermore encourage 
intergovernmental co-operation on the assumption that the role of the national states would 
be less hierarchical than its has been up until now.  
The new rationale for the provision of social policies in Spain follows the assumptions put 
forward by the principle of decentralisation, coincident with that of the European territorial 
subsidiarity at the sub-state level. It offers a valuable experience of policy innovation at the 
regional level. Spanish mesogovernments are no longer dependent on the state building 
programs of rationalisation for the implementation of their citizenship-centred welfare 
programmes. As the process of decentralization in Spain shows, regional entrepreneurs, 
policy-makers and local intelligentsia representatives can adopt many of the initiatives and 
roles once reserved for ‘enlightened’ élites, who in the past held the reins of power at the 
centre of their nation states.  
The implementation of regional systems of social protection in Spain is in line with the 
assumption that a more efficient welfare provision is plausible by means of a more effective 
Basque Cou. 6,875,000,000 16,052 40,500 1.24 2.55 
Canaries 1,199,982,564 3,096 40,000 0.21 1.26 
Cantabria 73,572,594 490 66,867 0.04 0.13 
Castille-Man. 727,565,800 2,116 45,500 0.18 0.39 
Castille Leon 1,353,000,000 3,306 30,000 0.51 0.39 
Catalonia 4,248,215,755 8,372 41,000 0.23 0.42 
Extremadura 210,000,000 671 32,500 0.18 0.59 
Galicia 1,598,370,788 5,003 35,580 0.18 0.44 
La Rioja 53,315,060 282 39,200 0.14 0.33 
Madrid 3,457,540,577 7,815 39,365 0.90 0.49 
Murcia 223,645,000 532 36,000 0.29 0.18 
Navarre 409,125,024 1,503 40,800 0.14 1.45 
Valencia 1,151,943,236 3,713 49,510 0.17 0.20 
1 Referred to the periodically perceived benefit of renta mínima (MTAS, 1997)
 
2 Referred to the aggregate expenditure of all periodical and ad hoc benefits, and the cost of insertion programmes. The ‘effort’ is the 
percentage of the costs of rentas mínimas in the total regional public expenditure (Ayala, 1997: 519) 
3 Referred to the total number of beneficiary households of all types of benefits of rentas mínimas (Ayala, 1997: 487) 
4 Both programmes of the renta mínima and the regional occupational training schemes are added up. 
Source: Columns 1,2 y 3, Spanish Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs; Columns 4 y 5, Ayala (1997) 
development of community care services, a more suitable monitoring of means-tested 
programmes, and a maximisation of economies of scale. It also provides for institutional 
means to facilitate democratic accountability at the meso and local levels.  
The leading role played by the Spanish mesogovernments in the redefinition of the ‘safety 
net’ implies, nevertheless, scenarios of future uncertainty. If it is true that they have been 
able to integrate social services and social assistance policies into a common network, the 
ever-latent risk of exacerbating inter-regional inequalities in welfare provision is to be 
underlined. Up until now, the mimesis effect among the Comunidades Autónomas has 
proved to be an effective barrier against open discrimination among them.  
Furthermore, the cycle ‘differential fact-comparative grievance-mimesis effect’ of the 
Spanish model of multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence has acted as a de facto equaliser in 
policy provision, although some differences have remained. Such a cycle of political 
behaviour has also brought about an extra incentive for regional policy innovation. The 
results of these reforms are to be assessed on a medium-term perspective. Longer time-
series for analyses are, thus, required to validate the case for welfare decentralization. The 
one lesson to be drawn from the Spanish experience is its attempt to put into practice both 
paramount principles of Europeanisation: subsidiarity and democratic accountability.   
Notes 
1 According to Esping-Andersen’s ironic reference to the ‘Four Laws of Sociology’: "Everything is different in 
the South". The other laws are: (1) Some do, some don’t, (3) Nothing ever works in India, and (4) There are 
no laws in Sociology (1993: 123-136).  
2 In Greece the ubiquitous Orthodox Church of Greece continues to be the most important form of private 
action for the family and the poor (Symeonidou, 1996). The same applies to the Roman Catholic Church -and 
its organisation Caritas- in Italy, Portugal and Spain. However, state welfare has widely increased in the last 
decades relegating the charitable action of the Church to a much complementary role. In Spain, for example, 
Caritas programmed 8,353 million pesetas to its 1988 social programme, an amount which was just above 9 
per cent of the newly created Ministry of Social Affairs' budget (Rodríguez-Cabrero, 1990).  
3 Italy and Greece are well above the EU mean percentage of 62.0 per cent for the per capita average 
pension (77.6 per cent and 78.8 per cent in 1991, respectively). This is not the case of Spain and Portugal 
(47.3 per cent and 42.1 per cent, respectively) with a more balanced inter-generation distribution of resources. 
In Italy it may be improper to speak of a ‘selfish’ generation but, according to F. Castles and M. Ferrera, "…
clearly there is a set of life-cycle distributions which strongly favour the interests of the old" (1996: 175).  
4 According to a 1996 national survey, 46.3 per cent of Spaniards agreed that "The State is responsible for 
each and every one of its citizens, and has the duty to help them to solve their problems"; 35.7 also agreed 
that "The State is only responsible for the well being of least-favoured citizens"; and 13.0 per cent were of the 
opinion that "Citizens are responsible themselves for their own well-being and have the duty to sort out their 
own problems" (Don’t knows: 5.1 per cent. CIS, 1996).  
5 Note that social services were already a domain for private intervention. The new scenario is precisely the 
building of public networks within which the third sector plays a subsidiary role.  
6 Note that in 1992, relatively and absolutely, more women than men were under education among groups 
ranging from 16 to 29 years. It is particularly worth noting that among the 16-19 year-olds, 63 per cent of 
women were receiving formal education as compared to 53 per cent of men. Furthermore, there was a 
difference of over 8 percentage points concerning the 20-24 year-olds (EPA, 1993). Note also that around 12 
per cent of the public expenditure on education is paid to concerted private schools. Together with non-
concerted private education, they both covered 31 per cent of the total student population in 1990 (38.6, pre-
school; 34.5 per cent, elementary; 28.7 per cent, middle; and 8.1 per cent, university).  
7 31 percent considered it as ‘more negative than positive’ (21%), and ‘totally negative’ (10 %). The remaining 
9 per cent corresponded to "Don’t Knows" (El País, Nov. 19, 1995).  
8 Concurrence is to be understood as the simultaneous happening of political events at state and sub-state 
levels in the framework of plural societies, as is the case of Spain. Thus, concurrence should not be made 
equal to that of competition. In a situation of ethnoterritorial concurrence there are interactions between state 
and sub-state actors, or between the latter among themselves. However there is no compulsion to eliminate 
other competing actors. Competition, instead, implies the aim of achieving the monopoly by means of the 
elimination of further competition from other competitors. According to Karl Popper (1976) a situation of 
concurrence can and ought to be explained as an unintentional consequence (usually unavoidable) of the 
human actions (conscious and planned) of the competitors.  
9 These elements are: (a) The conflicting intergovernmental relations; (b) The politicising of ethnoterritorial 
institutions; (c) The differential fact; (d) The centralist inertia; (e) The democratic decentralisation; (f) The 
comparative grievance; (g) The inter-territorial solidarity; (h) The centrifugal pressure; (i) The ethnoterritorial 
mimesis; and (j) The inductive allocation of powers (Moreno, 1995).  
10 Asymmetry and heterogeneity, both de jure and de facto, are particular traits in the process of Spanish 
‘federalisation’ (Moreno, 1997a/b).  
11 For an analysis of the impact of decentralisation on health provision, and the establishment of a National 
Health Service in Spain cf., respectively, Rico (1997) and Guillén & Cabiedes (1997). For a study of the 
somewhat similar context in Italy, see Fargion (1996, 1997).  
12 According to the model of ‘multiple ethnoterritorial concurrence’, the rule of the inductive allocation of 
powers in the Spanish process of decentralisation acknowledges the absence of a clear-cut constitutional 
division of powers in the three-tier system of government. This rule draws attention to the fact that the 
Spanish decentralisation process has followed an open model of territorial structuring, which only the passing 
of time has gradually defined, as it shall continue to do.  
13 Responsibilities in the provision of social services for municipalities of more than 20,000 inhabitants had 
already been established by the Basic Law for Local Government passed by the Spanish Parliament in 1982.  
14 The ministry was formed by the General Directorate of Social Action, the INSERSO, the Institutes for the 
Women and the Youth, and the Board for the Education and Care of the Disabled. It took also the 
responsibility of supervising the activities of NGOs, such as the Red Cross, the Blinds’ Organisation, and 
other non-profit private charities.  
15 This network of community centres has taken over much of the social system developed by the Catholic 
church during the 1960s. In the period 1989-96, the PSOE governments have not been opposed to lending 
support to private assistance and charities of a religious nature. Nevertheless, they have often tended to 
favour NGOs of a secular nature, as well as the Red Cross and the powerful National Organisation for the 
Blind (ONCE). Since 1996 the PP government has encouraged private assistance and concerted action with 
RC church institutions.  
16 The Basque government did not join this general agreement because it did not accept categorical 
financing.  
17 However the minimum salary decreased from 77.5 per cent of the per capita GDP, in 1980, to 52.4 per 
cent, in 1992.  
18 This central body has changed its name in 1996 (IMSERSO, Instituto de Migraciones y Servicios Sociales 
– Institute for Migration and Social Services). It has kept minor executive programmes regarding services for 
emigrants, as well as some functions of co-ordination with EU programmes.  
19 Articulated not only by nationalist and regionalist parties, but also by the increasingly important regional and 
federated branches of the main Spanish political formations (PP. PSOE, and IU). Internal processes of power 
accommodation within the Spanish parties have also greatly contributed to the internalisation by Spaniards of 
the federalisation of politics and policy-making. 
20 On this issue, cf. Arriba (1999), Ayala (1997); Gaviria & Laparra (1997), and Serrano & Arriba (1998).  
21 Except the Balearic Islands, where the programme was finally initiated in 1995. 
 
22 The case of the United Kingdom is paradigmatic in this respect. According to such interpretations, the 
legislative supremacy of Westminster would be preserved from supranational regulation originated at the 
‘federal’ institutions of the European Union. However, the devolution of power from to the constituent nations 
of the UK, and to amalgamated local authorities like the former Greater Council of London, could not be 
denied taking into account the same argumentative grounds.  
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